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On Philosophical Style
Michèle Le Dœuff and Luce Irigaray
Virpi Lehtinen
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI 
ABSTRACT Irigaray and Le Dœuff diagnose the problem of woman and philosophy
in terms of love. The differing solutions to the problem can be found in their
styles. Irigaray’s style is loving and dialogic, transforming the inherent structure
of love and reminding us of the traditional feminine position defined by men. Le
Dœuff’s style is critical and pluralistic and relates to her perception of the feminine
way of philosophical writing. These styles take into account the undervaluation of
the feminine in the apparently ‘neutral’ practices of philosophizing and surpass
the traditional or unreflected notions of the feminine style. Ultimately, the con-
sciously ‘subjective’ styles, with the inherent aims of self-reflectivity and openness
for other persons and texts, prove necessary when striving for truth and objectiv-
ity. Thus, Le Dœuff and Irigaray question the standard notion of philosophical
style as neutral ‘non-style’.
KEY WORDS affectivity ◆ couple ◆ Irigaray ◆ Le Dœuff ◆ love ◆ Sartre
◆ sexual difference ◆ style ◆ wisdom ◆ woman 
In an interview, philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch states: ‘I am
tempted to say that there is an ideal philosophical style which has a spe-
cial unambiguous plainness and hardness about it, an austere, unselfish
candid style.’ Iris Murdoch continues: ‘The literary writer deliberately
leaves a space for his reader to play in. The philosopher must not leave
any space’ (Murdoch, 1999: 4–5).
According to Murdoch’s ideal of philosophy, its universal requirements
of argumentation and conceptual clarity, there is no remarkable variation
in philosophical style, either individual or historical. Murdoch interest-
ingly points out the indispensability of style for all, even philosophical,
speech and writing, but attributes one specific style to philosophical
enterprises. I argue, however, that philosophy also allows, even demands,
stylistic variation. To this end, I examine the works of two philosophers,
who encourage us both to reflect on our philosophical styles and to pose
the question of sexual difference.
SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
I take as examples the styles of Michèle Le Dœuff’s (1989) L’Étude et le rouet
and Luce Irigaray’s (1984) L’Éthique de la différence sexuelle. These works
are exemplary in two senses. First, they extend the standard concept of
philosophical style explicitly both by arguing for its crucial importance
and by putting it into operation. Second, their styles are motivated by a
shared problem of thinking and writing as a woman philosopher. The
problem arises from the fact that the canon of philosophy is composed
of texts written by male philosophers. Furthermore, the fundamental
philosophical practices have been formed and reformed by one sex only.
Although women have studied philosophical questions and written
philosophical works, these writings are not part of the philosophical
canon, nor are sexuality or sexual difference included as themes.
However, there is one particular theme that links both philosophy and
sexual difference: love. Love plays a role in philosophical practices, as
Plato discussed in Symposium and Faidros. Also, Le Dœuff and Irigaray
connect themselves with the philosophical tradition by focusing on love:
both diagnose the problem of women and philosophy in terms of love. I
argue that Irigaray’s and Le Dœuff’s problematizations of the interconnec-
tion of love, sexual difference and wisdom provide the background
against which their philosophical styles can be identified and understood.
I study Irigaray’s and Le Dœuff’s philosophical styles in three intercon-
nected dimensions: the constitution of the philosophical self and its rela-
tion to itself, the relationship to other philosophers and the philosophical
tradition, and, finally, the relationship between self and other. Thus, in this
context style is understood as an existential notion indicating the modes of
being of the subject and its relations, not as a literary or linguistic concept.
With regard to scientific work, style refers to the whole of scientific activ-
ity, including ways of posing questions, applying and choosing methods,
constructing interpretations and presenting the process of research in writ-
ing. Despite its individuality, style is not created or voluntarily chosen by
the subject. Rather, it is assumed in shared practices and ideals. The indi-
vidual style repeats shared practices and ideals but also transforms them
in actively revivifying them (Goto, 2004: 101, 112–15; Heinämaa, 2003:
31–44; Stein, 1989: 115).
LISTEN, I ADDRESS YOU: L’ÉTHIQUE DE LA
DIFFÉRENCE SEXUELLE
Irigaray’s L’Éthique de la différence sexuelle is composed of essays and
essayist commentaries on classical and contemporary philosophical texts,
in which she discusses Plato’s notion of eros, Aristotle’s category of place,
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Spinoza’s notion of God, Descartes’ passion of wonder, Merleau-Ponty’s
concept of chiasm and Lévinas’s phenomenology of eros. The variety of
chosen topics does not remind one of any standard composition of crucial
philosophical themes. Even more extraordinary is the structure of the
work. In addition to essays that do not comment on any particular
philosopher, it is composed of three couples of philosophical contem-
poraries: Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Spinoza, Merleau-Ponty and
Lévinas. In these couples the successor can be seen as a critic and a
reverser of the predecessor’s philosophy. The relationship of reversion is
affirmed by the philosophical canon with regard to the presentation of
these couples in the works on the history of philosophy, in the commen-
taries and in encyclopaedias. Irigaray, however, does not want to belong
to this chain of predecessors. This she shows, among other things, by
focusing on certain topics and by formulating her critical comments.
Irigaray does not take as a starting point – not even in the mode of critique –
any one philosophy. She addresses a singular ‘you’, a person and a philoso-
pher at one time, but discusses with several philosophers in the temporal con-
tinuum of the work. She does not operate from an ‘impartial’ third-person
perspective or report discussions of other people, thus speaking with, at least
seemingly, unquestionable and ‘neutral’ authority. She does not abstract
from her own experience to construe a theory of the universal features of
experience in general or to discover the ultimate reality. Rather, Irigaray
keeps her discourse open both to her own experience, the experience of the
reader and strives for a more general level of the (feminine) experience. If we
study closely the structure of L’Éthique de la différence sexuelle it is possible to
identify several dialogues, several levels, which refer to one another.
First, Irigaray’s commentaries on the texts of classical and contempo-
rary philosophers form dialogues focusing on specific topics. Second, the
reader is invited to enter into a dialogue with the philosophical subject
‘Luce Irigaray’ constituting itself both in these dialogues and in the essays
preceding and following them.
The texts discussed are named but Irigaray’s position with respect
to them is not clearly critical or constructive, instead, it is either both or
wavers between the two. Irigaray’s way of posing questions to the text,
suggesting answers and abstaining from closing the discussion further
constitutes a special relationship to the original texts and to the writers. It
is often difficult to see where the source text ends and Irigaray’s commen-
tary begins. In this way, the reader is also invited to take a first-person
look at the original texts that Irigaray comments on in order to find out
his or her own position in relation to them, and, also, to identify Irigaray’s
voice more clearly. Thus, the third dialogic couple is formed of the male
philosopher and the actual reader.
As the reader is invited to form her own conception of the original text as
well as Irigaray’s approach to it, the specificity of Irigaray’s methodology
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and variety of topics becomes clearer. The reader is able to form a new
beginning for her own philosophizing, and to relate herself both to the
tradition and to Irigaray’s way of opening it up. The fourth dialogue
between the reader and Irigaray, now given from a new perspective, is
formed. The fourth dialogue, on the one hand, presupposes that the
reader has taken an analogous path to Irigaray in her work, although
from the reader’s own starting points. This common voyage, in the end,
offers an opportunity to use this work, enabling the possibility of distin-
guishing oneself, or of defining one’s own position, with regard to the tra-
dition and with regard to the Irigarayan point of view that challenges it.
By the multilayered dialogues, the reader is invited into an analogous
process of self-reflection, which has been effectuated by the writer. As the
materials studied are canonical philosophical writings, the self-reflection
happens with regard to the philosophical tradition. Thus, the self-reflec-
tion discloses our inheritance in the thinking, presupposed in all scientific
work. It also demonstrates new, possible modes of engaging or distancing
oneself from the tradition of inherited thought.
PASSIONATE STYLE
Irigaray’s style in L’Éthique de la différence sexuelle is extraordinary,
especially so if we share the ideal of philosophical style articulated by
Murdoch. Irigaray’s style is not plain, straightforward or neutral. Rather,
it is moving, passionate and poetic. Irigaray’s style is questioning and
fragmentary but still identifiable. These features together form an atmos-
phere of informality and intimacy, which is enforced by the conversa-
tional, rather than argumentative or exegetic, manner of discussion.
Irigaray does not offer a scholarly interpretation with definite conclusions
but engages herself in a dialogue with the texts and their writers as well
as with the reader. In this intimacy, ‘you’, the lover addressed, is entwined
with the reflective ‘I’ of both the reader and the philosopher addressed.
This suggests that the lover of wisdom – the philosopher or the reader –
and the ‘you’ of intimacy, have something in common.
First, in sharing the same tradition, the unquestioned prejudices and
unmapped possibilities might be the same for the philosopher and the
reader of Irigaray’s text, as the inheritor of the tradition. This suggests
that the self-evident notions that need to be questioned lie deep in our tra-
dition of thought. They are crystallized in the philosophical discourse but
are spread throughout our thought in general.
Second, in connection with the passionate and poetic characteristics is
the often emphasized feature that Irigaray’s writing affects not only other
texts but also us as readers of these texts. Accordingly, she character-
izes her style as ‘a double style’, containing both the aspect of lovers’
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discourse and the aspect of exposition of thoughts (Irigaray, 1987: 191; see
Heinämaa, 2001: 36; Vasseleu, 1998: 15).
Why then does Irigaray develop this double style? Why bring the lan-
guage of intimacy into the sphere of philosophy, which is considered a
public discourse par excellence in its claims for objectivity? To answer
these questions, I study more closely Irigaray’s articulation of the problem
of woman and philosophy and her task setting.
PROBLEM AND TASK
In the first essay of L’Éthique de la différence sexuelle, Irigaray defines the
task of a woman philosopher as follows:
I search for myself, as if I had been assimilated into maleness. I ought to
reconstitute myself on the basis of disassimilation. Rise again on the basis of
a culture, of works already produced by the other. Searching through what
is in them – for what is not there. What allowed them to be, for what is not
there. The conditions of possibility, for what is not there. Woman ought to
be able to find herself, among other things, through the images of herself
already deposited in history and the conditions of production of the works
of man, and not on the basis of his work, his genealogy. (Irigaray, 1993: 9–10;
1984: 17; see also Irigaray, 1982: 7)
Here Irigaray argues that the search for ‘the meaning of existing as a
woman’ must start from a situation in which woman is already found and
known (Chanter, 1995: 44; Heinämaa, 1996: 172).
Irigaray argues that the essential features of woman’s situation can be
traced from traditional philosophical texts. In this written tradition, the role
of a woman is to support the male philosopher and his projects as the wife,
daughter or mother. Such characters have personal relationships with the
philosopher and function as resources for the philosopher and his philo-
sophizing. They do not have voices of their own, either as women or
as philosophers (Irigaray, 1977: 147–8; 1982: 110; cf. Le Dœuff, 1989: 28, 118;
Shapiro, 2002: 197–200). The presumption is that in the sphere of private
intimacy, in affective and/or sexual relationships, no words are needed
(Irigaray, 1982: 110). Thus, speech and writing are separated from sensibil-
ity and affectivity. Sensibility and affectivity, for their part, are associated
with femininity rather than with neutrality or masculinity (which, for
Irigaray, are one and the same thing) and speech and writing capable of
reflecting these dimensions of subjectivity are not developed.
Understood in this way, woman’s position is defined by and through
man. Woman has no voice of her own, and man speaks for her in the sphere
of the intersubjective without addressing her as a member of that sphere or
without speaking with her in that sphere. If the position from which to speak
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is understood as a condition for the constitution of responsible, ethical sub-
jectivity (Irigaray, 1987: 184), the consequences of woman’s silence are seri-
ous: without the possibility of speech, no relation between two subjects – and
thus no ethics – is possible. In the lack of interaction in speech and writing,
the ‘intersubjective’ relation between man and woman is a relation of a male
subject to a feminine other presented as an object or material. However, even
if women and femininity in the sphere of the intersubjective are presented
by men as the material or object of desire or love, this does not mean that
women in themselves are incapable of speech and writing.
LOVE RECONSIDERED: DOUBLE STYLE IN OPERATION
I suggest that by her intimate and interrogative style Irigaray exposes the
traditional relation of a woman to philosophy either as an object of love
or desire or as a condition of possibility for masculine subjectivity, strictly
distinguished from the activities of thought and meaningful speech. She
gives us descriptions of the body both as it is lived by women, and in
encounters with the sexual other, beginning from the elemental affective
and sensible dimensions of subjectivity. Thus she forms a new point of
view in the discussion of love and desire. This occurs on two levels.
Irigaray expresses these emotions in her own right and in her own way.
Thus she both creates an alternative to the earlier articulations of desire
and love, and studies and questions the articulations insofar as they are
descriptions of women without relying on the point of view of woman.
The female position, as defined by man, is changed by woman becoming
a subject of her own love and desire (Irigaray, 1987: 193, 194).
Second, when Irigaray takes this topic of woman’s position and con-
nects it to philosophical ideas of truth and wisdom, she changes the
situation of woman in philosophy. This, for its part, leads to another trans-
formation: the female speech position is transformed into a specific mode
of philosophizing, a way of speaking through love about wisdom and
truth. The female lover takes the position of a responsible subject by
becoming capable of speech and writing. The transformation from an
object or resource with no identifiable style to a responsible speaking sub-
ject is effectuated by the double style of amorous writing.
This model of philosophizing – loving wisdom – does not extract from
thought and ethics the subject’s affectivity and sensibility. Rather affectiv-
ity and sensibility are perceived as indispensable for theoretical activity.
Thus, they have to be taken up and studied, both as the themes and as the
ways of relating to other texts and persons. In this way, we can become
conscious of the multidimensionality of our relationships and be able to
cultivate these relations. In order to effect a change in the value-hierarchy
between reason and passion and to create a new mode of relationship –
sexual difference – Irigaray argues that sensibility, passivity and affectivity
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are indispensable elements of subjectivity in both its modes: feminine and
masculine. She suggests that the condition for the possibility of the rela-
tionship of two subjects is in our capacity to be touched and moved by an
other who is sexually different from us. Such a touching and moving can
also happen through words and writing (Irigaray, 1987: 195; 1977: 76).
The textual couples effectuated by Irigaray can become a source for
new dialogues and new ways of questioning. But there is still more to this
style than the mere aim of showing the possibility of a philosophical dia-
logue between a female and a male philosopher through writing. Irigaray
advocates the dialogic model of philosophizing in general and argues that
sexual difference is indispensable for a genuine dialogue regulated by the
idea of truth. She demands that we scrutinize the impact of the idea of
sexual difference in our ways of thinking. This impact can be studied only
if the dialogue is actualized between a woman and a man: neither of the
two is capable of sorting it out alone.
It is the problem of sexual difference that leads Irigaray to reject the idea
of an impartial philosopher able to extract the most general features of our
subjectivity alone by solitary reflection. She does this by opening a space
between two perspectives, male and female, and demands that this space
or tension is opened or effectuated and maintained especially in philoso-
phizing. This inherent aim can be found in two passions, which are
methodologically crucial in Éthique: Plato’s eros and Descartes’ wonder (see
Heinämaa, 2001: 32–9; Songe-Moller, 1997: 23–36; Lehtinen, 2000: 213–38).
I WAS BORN EVERYWHERE: L’ÉTUDE ET LE ROUET
In her early article published in L’Imaginaire philosophique as ‘Cheveux
longues, idées courtes’1 Michèle Le Dœuff diagnoses the same asymmetry
in the man–woman relationship, which is the starting point of Irigaray’s
critique of philosophy. Le Dœuff’s diagnosis relies on her enquiries into
the works, textual documents and lives of women who have philoso-
phized and their status in philosophical societies and institutions. For
Le Dœuff, the connection between the asymmetry of the positions of man
and woman in philosophy and philosophical style occurs upon two occa-
sions. These are the initiation into the philosophical and the idea of philo-
sophical originality correlating with the idea of the philosophical.
Le Dœuff states, following the famous Platonic dialogues Phaedra and
Symposium, that the dyadic relationship necessarily belongs to philosoph-
ical didactics. This holds for both men and women. In both cases, the
desire for philosophizing is directed or aroused by an admired teacher.
Thus, like Irigaray, Le Dœuff also sees the entry to the philosophical as
an affective process. However, the initial situation is different for the two
sexes, so there are also two different ways to proceed. In one case,
the pupil and the teacher are both male. At some stage of the process of
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initiation the other male teachers help, perhaps only by their presence, to
question the mastery of the admired teacher. This enables the disappoint-
ment needed in philosophizing to occur. If the feeling of lack in this con-
text never arises, the pupil has become a member in a philosophical
school. However, this scheme departs from the dyadic phase, since usu-
ally there are also other pupils of one master, a relationship of one to
many. (Le Dœuff, 1980b: 141, 142; see also Songe-Moller, 2002: 149–52).
In the case of women, the situation has been different. In the history of
philosophy, access for women to the institutions of philosophizing has been
rare. Nor have there been many female teachers. This has meant, first, that
the didactic relationships have been private, without institutional support
or constraint. Second, usually there has only been one master for the pupil,
and, moreover, a master of the opposite sex. These features have factually
led to amorous relationships. As the philosophical couples from different
periods of time Le Dœuff lists, among others, Hipparchia and Crates,
Princess Elizabeth and Descartes, Heloïse and Abelard and de Beauvoir
and Sartre. Le Dœuff has invented the concept of theoretico-amorous transfer-
ence (transfert érotico-théorique) to describe the asymmetry in access to phil-
osophy. It is important to know that Le Dœuff’s list does not include all the
women philosophers of the past, not even those who have had an amorous
relationship with a male philosopher.2
The problem of theoretico-amorous transference is, from the point of view
of rigorous thought, the identification of the master and his philosophical
ideas. This identification gives the illusion of a perfect philosophical sys-
tem and a philosopher-master capable of answering all questions. In this
kind of relationship, the experience of lack, according to Le Dœuff indis-
pensable for philosophizing, never rises. In many known cases women’s
role has been to be a private pupil (and/or muse, beloved or, in the best
case, a novelist) whereas men have occupied the position of master
philosopher. This has led to the more general understanding of women
being supporters of male philosophers rather than being philosophers in
their own right.3 In such a setting, the philosopher’s interest has not been
in encouraging critical questions concerning his own thought or his
system. In this scheme, neither men nor women become independent
thinkers, since for an independent thinker no one philosophical system is
enough, not even one’s own. Autonomous thinking presupposes access to
philosophy in general (Le Dœuff, 1980b: 141; 1989: 73).
Le Dœuff argues that such a confused identification is possible only because
philosophical work and the philosophical person are contrasted to certain
practices and characteristics associated with women. This identification is also
visible in notions that rigidly separate philosophy from other modes of inves-
tigation. The problem has concerned both the self-understanding of the
philosophers and the reception of their work by others. These roles have been
further enforced by institutions and the processes of canonization.4
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Le Dœuff also connects asymmetry to the time and place of her own
thinking, writing and teaching by studying how the university institution
and the philosophical community set criteria for philosophical independ-
ence and originality. Le Dœuff identifies two different styles of (philosoph-
ical) writing: masculine and feminine, usually corresponding to the sex of
the writer. Le Dœuff claims to find these styles among anonymously writ-
ten exams. The masculine style can be characterized as authoritative. It
can lead either to ‘decisive and profound reading’ or to ‘a fantastic misin-
terpretation’. The feminine style is receptive and attentive towards the
texts. Examiners comment on examples of this style in phrases like:
‘acuteness in detailed commentary but lack of overview’. According to
Le Dœuff, this kind of approach can produce good results as it provides ‘a
distanced kind of reading which enables one to see what is implicit in the
text or to pick out the “gaps” in theorization’. However, as Le Dœuff
points out, this style is not highly valued. This is obvious both with regard
to the evaluations of exams and to what is considered original in philo-
sophical writings and ideas (Le Dœuff, 1980b: 161).
Le Dœuff suggests two possible explanations for the undervaluation.
The first is that women fail in becoming philosophers, which means that
they are polite to others’ discourses, but do not develop a discourse of
their own. The second option, which Le Dœuff herself prefers, is that this
approach is underestimated because it is feminine and associated with
lack of authority (Le Dœuff, 1980b: 162; cf. Irigaray, 1977: 76; 1987: 187;
Heinämaa, 1997: 21–5). Nevertheless, philosophical genres can be found
to which the so-called ‘feminine’ kind of style seems to belong more eas-
ily than to others. This style of writing seems to suit well the genre of writ-
ing commentaries, whereas it is not usually associated with original
philosophical work (Le Dœuff, 1980b: 162).
Despite the similarities in the diagnosis of the problem of women and
philosophy, the aims of Irigaray and Le Dœuff differ. Le Dœuff’s aim is to
deconstruct rather than transform the couple structure. Thus, Le Dœuff’s
position seems almost directly opposed to that of Irigaray. I argue, how-
ever, that there are, despite obvious differences, interesting connections
and similarities between their projects. I do this by focusing on the
common target of their critique: the phenomenological tradition and its
account of the self–other relation, as exemplified in Sartre’s work.
THE WORK AND THE LETTER
Sartre as an individual thinker and the phenomenological tradition as a
whole share a methodological problem that is insurmountable from the
pluralist point of view of Le Dœuff. This problem is the subject, the ego, as
the starting point of the philosophical enterprise. This central methodical
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approach can be found in Sartre’s ideas of values and morals, which are
based on an abstraction of generic humanity, claims Le Dœuff. According to
Le Dœuff, Sartre assumes on the fundamental ontological level that we can-
not have intersubjective relations (Le Dœuff, 1989: 12, 213). Ultimately, on
the basic level of being, the subject is freed from intersubjectivity, and as
such she or he is free from all external constraints. Le Dœuff argues that this
line of thought makes the Sartrean ethics of authenticity deeply problematic
to feminism: it makes the analysis of oppression fundamentally obsolete,
because of the emphasis on the ethical choices made by an autonomous
individual5 (Le Dœuff, 1980a: 3). Even though the emphasis on the respon-
sibility of the subject for its acts is a promising idea, with respect to Sartre’s
philosophy this ideal fails, in practice, when we consider the (philosophi-
cal) style of Sartre. The exposure of his thought shows a tension with the
crucial ethical doctrine of the subject as responsible for its acts.
Le Dœuff points out that the ego as an unquestioned starting point and
end result is not only central in Sartre’s ontological and ethical work, but is
also operative in his posthumously published letters edited by de Beauvoir
according to Sartre’s wishes and titled Lettres au castor et à quelques autres
(Sartre, 1983). Only some of de Beauvoir’s own letters are included but
other female correspondents are not included in the collection. This makes
Sartre appear as the only speaking subject, capable of defining and redefin-
ing the relationship between himself and others. Ultimately, Le Dœuff
argues, the question is about defining the meaning of himself and others
insofar as they belonged to his world. Sartre does not allow himself to be
questioned by others, neither does he offer them the possibility of present-
ing their views: the plurality of views and lived relations is silenced in
favour of Sartre’s (Le Dœuff, 1989: 204, 207). This is both on the account of
the selection of the material, and the content of it. As a result, the subjectiv-
ity of correspondents is diminished. The private and partial discussions
remain in the sphere of private intimacy despite the publication of the ‘cor-
respondence’. Accordingly, the position of the reader is given as that of a
voyeur in this one-sided ‘exchange’, being unable to take part in the discus-
sion or to break into the monologue. Le Dœuff suggests that in these writ-
ings – L’être et le néant and Lettres au castor – Sartre’s solipsistic philosophy
and his private life merge (Le Dœuff, 1989: 204, 207).
According to Le Dœuff, Sartre’s approach in both cases creates an
illusion of self-sufficiency. Le Dœuff challenges this self-sufficiency by
showing that admiring women – not philosophers themselves, though
sometimes knowledgeable about philosophy – are needed as mirrors for
the ideas and passions of the speaking subject (Le Dœuff, 1989: 149).
Women are integrated into the philosophical system as examples of bad
faith and sexual bodies, but not as ideal or imaginary partners in the
exchange of ideas or in the creation of concepts. So the main problem of
Sartre’s philosophical work is that the difference between women and
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men forms a conceptual resource in the construction of arguments, but
neither this difference, nor other differences, are taken into account in the
self-reflection of the (philosophizing) subject (Le Dœuff, 1989: 86–9).
It would, however, be a mistake to connect Sartre’s approach to a way
of philosophizing practised particularly by men (Le Dœuff, 1989: 105).
Following the specification of Robin May Schott (2003: 28), this style can
be identified as masculinist. It should also be noticed, that a feminist
framework does not self-evidently save us from the problems of Sartre’s
philosophy diagnosed by Le Dœuff.
Although Le Dœuff’s analysis of Sartre’s work reminds one of Irigaray’s
notion of women as objects and as a resource for philosophizing, her cri-
tique of Irigaray’s thought is sharp. Le Dœuff connects Irigaray to the exis-
tentialist tradition indirectly by taking up her idea in Ce sexe qui n’en est pas
un (Irigaray, 1977) of philosophical discourse as a master’s discourse that
gives laws to the other discourses (Le Dœuff, 1980a: 2). Le Doueff thinks that
the consequence of this privileged position of philosophizing is that the pri-
mary enemies are ‘idealistic logic and metaphysical logos’ (Le Dœuff, 1980a:
278; 1989: 2; see also Deutscher, 2002: 18; Whitford, 1991: 6). Since the cri-
tique of Irigaray is found within the same context as the critique of Sartre,
it suggests that according to Le Dœuff also Irigaray’s discourse is generaliz-
ing and abstract and is thus unable to grasp the concreteness of oppression.
The view on philosophical style presented by Murdoch is also criticized
by Le Dœuff. Le Dœuff suspects that the philosophical enterprise aiming
merely to clarify concepts might on closer scrutiny be revealed as value-
laden (Le Dœuff, 1989: 44, 45). This is because, in believing in its own neu-
trality and pureness, this approach has forgotten the need to develop
methods to enquire into its own way of philosophizing.6
As an alternative to the mode of exchange represented by Sartre, Le
Dœuff proposes an attitude she calls ‘the adventure of a message’. This
means a written message directed towards another actual person, and not
simply to an abstracted not-me (autrui) (Le Dœuff, 1989: 205). The mes-
sage, by its nature as a message, exposes the sender as vulnerable: she or
he might receive an unanticipated response. Although all expressed
thoughts can be more or less freely interpreted by others, the difference
lies in the attitude of the writer: the writer can either deny and minimize
this freedom of others or he or she can accept and affect it, and even inte-
grate this acceptance into the style of writing. The acceptance requires
that the writer perceives him- or herself realistically, as a finite subject
exposed to errors and self-deception. This would mean that the possible
errors and imperfection would not be projected onto others. The attitude
presupposes that the self is by some means able to distance itself from
itself, for instance with the help of textual or concrete others. This idea can
also be operative in philosophical work, and, it seems to me, that it works
in this way in Le Dœuff’s L’Étude et le rouet.
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NOTEBOOK
Le Dœuff’s L’Étude et le rouet is written in the form of four notebooks. I
argue in this final part of the article that the notebook form enacts Le
Dœuff’s understanding of philosophizing and its sexual dimensions and
that this form is crucial to her way of both differentiating and connecting
between philosophical ideas and persons without compromising the
openness of the discussion.
Notebooks are usually written in the first person, but they are distin-
guished from diaries by their organization of topics rather than by the actu-
ally experienced life events of the author. Notebooks present the work of
thought as it proceeds in time, and not as a ready-made result or as a task
already completed. A treatise is usually connected to one discipline only,
whereas notebooks are collections of different parts and pieces, containing
seeds and arguments from different fields of thought, life, science, politics,
culture, literature and history. A notebook can function as a starting point
for an autobiography,7 but also for an argument or a treatise. Notebooks can
bring together any material contributing to creative thinking and they pre-
serve the paths of thought for a great variety of revisions.
A notebook does not directly address another subject. It is not written
to anyone in particular: it would have been written anyway, even if no
one read it. The relationship between the writer and the reader is estab-
lished through topics and their connections. As such it does not carry sub-
jective or sexual, affective elements in its style, at least not in the way of
fulfilling other persons’, or even traditions’ expectations.
WORKING TOWARDS POLYPHONY
Based on the idea of notebooks explicated above, Le Dœuff states that
her aim in L’Étude et le rouet is to work on subjectivity, both her own and
her readers’. Le Dœuff describes her approach as ‘wandering thought’,
‘methodological subjectivism’ and ‘adventurous rigorousness’ (Le Dœuff,
1989: 15, 244; Björk, 2002: 293). She states that her self-reflection works
through the use of irony and imagination, which allow us to take distance
both from ourselves and from the self-evident conceptions inherited from
the tradition (Le Dœuff, 1989: 50, 244).
Similarly, Le Dœuff warns us of the dangers of affirming the idea that
women and men have their own discourse, own values or own access to
knowledge (Le Dœuff, 1980b: 36; 1998: 10). This idea of difference enforced
by several male philosophers connects women, affectivity and irrationality.
It has led to a belittling of women’s intellectual capacities and has been used
as an argument in denying women the possibility of speaking for them-
selves in the sphere of speech and writing. Rather, in the spirit of Le Dœuff,
we should ask to what extent these ideas still persist among ourselves, as
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the traditional idea of difference according to Le Dœuff is kept alive by the
feminists of difference.8
Rather than being gentle or suggestive, ‘feminine’ in the traditional sense,
Le Dœuff’s style is straight to the point, ironic and polemic, it is sharp, mock-
ing and challenging. Le Dœuff’s distancing style is in line with her ideas of
multilinearity and polygenesis of thought as well as her rejection of the
dyad-model of philosophizing. The attempt to open plurality and to reject
the traditional idea of difference in thought leads to the idea of rejecting the
asymmetrical loving couple as the model of philosophizing. Instead, Le
Dœuff advocates eros as the love of wisdom originating from lack and disap-
pointment, and thus separating itself from love directed towards the persons
(Le Dœuff, 1980b: 142, 143). She claims that this is necessary if we want to
strengthen the position of women philosophers. In practice, this separation
can be accomplished by encouraging women to work in peer groups and by
opening institutions for women and thus gaining access to the objective
knowledge (Le Dœuff, 1980b: 166; 1998: 13, 17).9 In this setting, philosophy
could open itself to women without intermediation by male philosophers.
Furthermore, this would have an effect on philosophizing in general.
Le Dœuff understands philosophy, at its best, as the task of critical
thought within the philosophical community comprising several different
subjects coming from different origins. Le Dœuff provides us with a model
of a desire for philosophy, which orientates itself by problems but does
not aim to complete a perfect whole, whether as an idea of accomplished
wisdom or promises of salvation (Le Dœuff, 1989: 132, 197; cf. de Beauvoir,
1976: 32). By her stylistic choices, Le Dœuff acknowledges the impossibil-
ity of complete (self) knowledge, and shows that thinking should be
open-ended and tentative (Le Dœuff, 1989: 18). According to Le Dœuff, it
is precisely the ideas of truth and objectivity that require that we rethink
the idea of the philosophical work as being incomplete by its very nature.
To this end, the reader is required to keep ‘the element of doubt’ in oper-
ation. Le Dœuff invites the reader not only to question the philosophical
tradition with her, but also to question Le Dœuff as well as ourselves.
Le Dœuff’s style of writing fights against the scholarly habit of exegetic
studies of the philosophical canon. It also questions our ideas of philo-
sophical commentary and original philosophical work. It challenges us
and offers us an opportunity to begin our thinking anew with the help of
its openings and its spirit of radical questioning, not from an already
determined foundation but from our own position. Thus, it concretely
works towards polyphony.
CONCLUSIONS: TWO FEMININE STYLES
Irigaray and Le Dœuff share the idea of the existence of the feminine style.
Both connect the feminine style and its underestimation to the amorous
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man–woman couple. However, their ways of interpreting and relating to
this style differ.
Irigaray transforms the traditional idea of eros as shared into two
mutually exclusive ways of loving either spiritually or carnally by offer-
ing us love and dialogue as models for philosophizing. She extends
thinking to the levels of sensibility and affectivity, and thus to all rela-
tions. For Irigaray, love demands distancing from oneself and one’s own
interests, whether the other term of the relationship is a text, a speech or
a person.
Le Dœuff thinks that affection for the other person belongs to the initial
phase of philosophizing. It is important to recognize this situation in
order to encourage the pupils to philosophical independence, and the
pupils themselves in order to strive for it. The aim is to keep the persons
and their ideas separate. We strive for truth, or even love or desire it, as
concrete individuals, and are thus in need of self-reflection and criticism
offered by the philosophical community.
The disagreement in the notions eros, feminine style and the idea of sex-
ual difference should not obscure the fact that the styles of both Irigaray
and Le Dœuff could be interpreted as feminine in their own contexts and
according to their own ideals. As such they develop, in their own ways,
the ideal of feminine style, and connect in distancing from the traditional
notions of woman and feminine, as they are articulated by the male
philosophers. In addition, both question our habitualities in practising
philosophy and both examine the preconditions of objectivity. The out-
come of both analyses is that without reconsidering the issue of sexual
difference, objectivity cannot be achieved or even reached. The ‘subjec-
tive’ style of philosophizing is crucial: the philosophizing subject and its
relations have to be perceived and studied, when striving for truth and
objectivity. This aim does not allow a neutral philosophical style decipher-
ing (marks of) subjectivity to be an ideal. For both Irigaray and Le Dœuff,
such an ideal would prevent radical self-reflection, which forms the core
of philosophy for both these thinkers.
Irigaray and Le Dœuff create, in their own ways and in their own styles,
positions of subjectivity and authority that depart from the traditional
models. Instead of offering us a feminist school, a possibility to become
their followers or to challenge their doctrines by reversal, both Michèle Le
Dœuff and Luce Irigaray demand that we work towards our own practices,
styles and habits of thinking, experiment with new topics and pursue new
directions with our questioning. They both demand that we acknowledge
our own concrete starting points and surpass them. One of those starting
points is our sexual identity. This means that the relationships between the
reader and the author, self and other, must be transformed, and the notions
of philosophical community, philosophy and its task must be rethought.
Thus, by their styles, Le Dœuff and Irigaray criticize, recreate and respond
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to the tradition of philosophical writing that fails to address them as
woman thinkers.
NOTES
I am grateful to Sara Heinämaa and Martina Reuter for their insightful and criti-
cal comments. I also wish to thank Luce Irigaray for generously commenting on
the manuscript.
1. First published as ‘Women and Philosophy’ in Radical Philosophy 17 (Oxford,
1977).
2. It is interesting to compare the couples discussed by Le Dœuff with the
case of Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, Arendt’s case differs from
Le Dœuff’s model: Arendt has become a philosopher both for herself and for
the philosophical community. Following Le Dœuff’s insights one could
claim that her independence was saved by her philosophical as well as
political disappointment in her teacher/lover. She first left Marburg to write
her dissertation with Karl Jaspers in Heidelberg. Later, being a Jew, she had
to leave Germany first for France and then for New York, where she created
an intellectual community of her own (Arendt and Heidegger, 2004: 41, 42,
52, 53; Young-Brüehl, 1982: 42–110).
3. On the philosophical relationship of Descartes and Princess Elizabeth
of Bohemia, see Le Dœuff (1980b: 137, 139; see also Alanen, 2004: 193–214;
Reuter, 2000: 33–9; Shapiro, 2002: 199, 200). Philosophical style plays a cru-
cial role in this discussion.
4. For a notion of a philosopher as a writer established in the de Beauvoir
scholarship, see Heinämaa (2003: 1–18).
5. According to Le Dœuff (1980a), de Beauvoir was able to establish an existen-
tialist ethics in which the idea of being responsible for one’s acts and indiffer-
ences led to a fruitful analysis of women’s oppression. Further evidence of the
importance of de Beauvoir’s philosophy for understanding the actual lives of
women is offered by Heinämaa (2003: 132–3), who develops Beauvoirian phe-
nomenology in analysing, for example, the experience of giving birth. Schott
(2004: 93–114) applies de Beauvoir’s ethics to articulate the specific kind of
ethical failures of sexual war crimes.
6. For Le Dœuff’s methodology developed in the context of analytic philoso-
phy, see La Caze (2002).
7. For de Beauvoir on women, biography and literature, see, for example de
Beauvoir (1976: 618). About autobiography and its connection to the femi-
nine world, see also Irigaray (1987: 191). Both suggest that the feminine
modes of surpassing a singular life of an individual – in other words, femi-
nine subjectivity – are still to be created.
8. In L’Imaginaire philosophique, Irigaray as the writer of the Spéculum de l’autre
femme figures as a critical feminist, but later as an uncritical feminist of dif-
ference (Le Dœuff, 1980b: 153; 1989: 132, 247–53; 1998: 118–19).
9. This is Le Dœuff’s project in her latest book, Le Sexe du savoir. In this work
Le Dœuff’s interlocutors are, among others, the independent women
philosophers of the past such as Christine de Pisan, Gabrielle Suchon and
Anna Maria van Schurman. Thus, Le Dœuff also widens the circle of our
peers, since these philosophers are not part of the official history of philos-
ophy. Also Arendt figures here as a critic of totalitarian thought.
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